

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE AIR TRANSPORT MARKET

Nathalie LENOIR September 2011



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Outline of presentation

- →1 The regulated period
 - ➤ 1-1 International traffic
 - > 1-2 The domestic US market
 - ➤ 1-3 Europe
- →2 The deregulation years
 - > 2-1 The US deregulation
 - > 2-2 International traffic
 - > 2-3 The European single market
- →3 An evolving situation





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1- The regulated period : a historically regulated industry

- →Domestic traffic in the USA regulated until 1978
- → European "Domestic" traffic liberalized between 1987 and 1997
- → International traffic still regulated by bilateral agreements between countries
 - ➤ limited competition : some freedom in prices and frequencies but limitations in numbers of airlines

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1-1 International traffic

- → 1918-1939 : the era of absolute national sovereignty
- → 1944-1978 : the era of regulation : the Chicago-Bermudas organization
- → 1978 ...: gradual liberalization of international relations





The era of absolute national sovereignty (1918 – 1939)

- → Paris conference in 1919 : principle of national sovereignty
 - > airspace above a country belongs to that country
- → International relations based on reciprocity
 - much haggling (commercial bargaining)
 - > much distrust and political considerations
 - ➤ little efficiency
- System not favorable to the development of international trade

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The era of regulation : 1939-1978

- The Chicago conference (November 1944)
 - > organized a standard framework for international aviation
- The bilateral agreements
 - > The UK-US agreement "Bermuda" in 1946
 - ➤ How it worked until 1978
- →IATA and the price fixing conferences
 - ➤ International Air Transport Association (IATA) created in 1945





The Chicago conference : conflicting positions

- The USA propose a bilateral framework for negotiations
 - in a liberal context (prices, frequencies...)
- The UK proposes a world authority to allocate traffic rights and manage all regulations
 - > economic regulation (prices, frequencies...)
 - > other areas (security, standards...)
- Choice made of a bilateral framework
 - > with possibilities of regulating prices and capacities



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The results of the Chicago conference


- Creation of ICAO
 - > world authority, establishing standards in terms of transport, security, air traffic control...
 - > no powers of economic regulation
- Definition of "freedoms of the air"
 - "exhaustive" list of what kind of routes an airline can do
 - definition of 5 "freedoms"
- Framework of bilateral agreements





The technical freedoms

- → First freedom: right to fly over a territory
 - ➤ The British carrier BA overflies France
- → Second freedom: right to make technical stops in a foreign country
 - BA stops in France without taking passengers




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
The commercial air freedoms

- → 3rd freedom: right to disembark passengers in a foreign country when coming from home state
- → 4th freedom: right to embark passengers in a foreign country and take them to home country
- Air China flying from Beijing to Tokyo (3rd), and taking passengers in Tokyo back to China (4th)



The commercial air freedoms

- → 5th freedom: Continue service of 3rd or 4th freedom to third country.
 - Air China flying from
 Beijing to Tokyo and then
 on to Los Angeles and
 taking passengers in
 Tokyo




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The additional freedoms


- → 6th freedom*: combine 3rd and 4th freedom rights, to open a service between two foreign countries
- Example: Air China flying from Paris to Tokyo through Beijing





The additional freedoms

- → 7th freedom : 5th freedom without restrictions
 - Air China flying from Japan to the USA





Home country


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The additional freedoms

- ** 8th and 9th freedom: "cabotage" with or without restrictions: right to fly inside a foreign country
 - British Airways flies inside France
 - Air China flies inside Japan





The Agreements

- The Transit Agreement: 97 countries over 159 in Chicago, agree to sign this agreement to exchange technical freedoms. Many signed later on.
- The Transport Agreement: a second agreement was proposed in Chicago, to exchange commercial freedoms. It was however not signed, and never came into effect



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Framework of bilateral agreements

- Points of entry between countries
 - Different from routes opened!
- Freedom exchanged (3-4-5)
- → Designated carrier(s) for each country
 - > carriers designated by name
- → Capacities (fixed or not)
 - > 50/50 if fixed
- Pricing rules





IATA : International Air Transport Association

- Created in 1945 as an association of airlines
- → Role of IATA:
 - Organize price fixing conferences
 - > Organize cooperation between airlines : interlining, pooling agreements.
- → Counter-power to the governments
- → Today most major airlines and others...
 - about 230 members worldwide

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IATA members : North America

- > Air Canada
- ➤ Air Transat
- > Alaska Airlines
- > American Airlines
- > Atlas Air
- Cargojet Airways
- Continental Airlines

- Delta Air Lines
- > FedEx
- > Hawaiian Airlines
- > JetBlue
- United Airlines
- > UPS
- US Airways

Who is missing?





The bilateral agreements

- First agreement signed between the US and the UK in 1946: The Bermuda I agreement
- How it worked until 1978 : principle of reciprocity
 - > Exchange of entry points (3rd and 4th freedom) and fifth freedom
 - > mono-designation
 - > equal share of capacity
 - > very restrictive rule until 1978 : double approval rule
- → No competition on international routes!



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1-2 The domestic VS market

- → 1925 1938 : Beginnings of commercial aviation with the Air mail Act
- → 1938 1978 : The era of regulation under the Civil Aeronautics Board
- → 1978 ...: liberalization of domestic aviation with the "Airline Deregulation Act"





The beginnings : 1925 - 1938

- Air Mail Act signed in 1925
 - Postal service entrusted to private carriers
 - Generous contracts from federal government : efforts to develop postal air services
- → Important development of air transport even for passengers
 - ➤ In 1926, 13 airlines, 2 millions of RPKs
 - ➤ In 1930, 38 airlines, 137 millions of RPKs

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1934 - 1938 : Crisis years

- → In 1934 federal subsidies are questioned and contracts cancelled
 - > The Post Office Department (POD) and the airlines are under suspicion of "complicity"
 - > The POD is accused of protecting the airlines
- The system is not economically sound
 - > Airlines use subsidies for mail to transport passengers
 - Prices are linked to costs neither for post nor for passengers
 - bankruptcies and incidents are multiplying





1938 : A global regulation (1)

Aim:

- > promote development of air transport : air transport seems particularly promising in this large territory protect the industry from bankruptcy and the public against abusive prices
- Tool: government agency regulating the market
 - > as exists in other transport industries (railroads, 1887, roads: "motor carrier act" 1935)
 - In the USA public services regulation began with transport modes

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Global networks and cross subsidies

- In a global network, some routes are more profitable than others
- →One means of developing such a global network is to use cross-subsidies:
 - > use profits from profitable routes to subsidize non profitable ones
 - > possible only if there is no price competition on routes, when airline is in monopoly situation on the network or when prices are regulated





1938 : A global regulation (2)

- → Why use regulation of the market?
 - there seems to be economies of scales : no competition possible
 - > Fragile industry: protection from destructive competition
 - > the objective is to develop a small number of large airlines and a global US network covering many cities
- How to do it:
 - > by protecting airlines from competition,
 - by subsidizing them
 - by promoting cross subsidies

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1938 : The civil Aeronautics Act

- → Creation of CAB : Civil Aeronautics Board
 - > Federal agency (at first Civil Aeronautics Authority)
- → CAB regulates all economic aspects of air transport
 - > Entry on the market: certification of trunks, locals
 - > Traffic rights on each route
 - > Tariffs
 - > Agreements and mergers between airlines
 - > Subsidies for small routes
- → After 1940, the CAB regulates also safety aspects





The policies of CAB (1)

- Allow very little or no entry on the markets
 - by certification of airlines: certification of trunk airlines in 1938 (19 trunks), no certifications of trunks thereafter. Certification of local airlines(23 locals) in 1940
- → Allow little or no competition on routes
 - > by restricting routes to one or two airlines (depending on traffic)
 - by forbidding price competition : CAB regulates prices
 - but no control over frequencies or capacities

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The policies of CAB (2)

- → Regulates mergers
 - > prevents bankruptcies by allowing some mergers
 - > try to prevent monopolization of markets by preventing others
- Subsidizes small routes
 - in 1938 subsidies are one third of revenues for airlines
 - > later CAB encourages cross-subsidies (by authorizing high prices on profitable routes): after 1959 no subsidies for trunks
 - > until 1978 still some subsidies for small routes





The effects of regulation : the US air transport system

- → Important development of traffic
 - > x 300 between 1938 and 1978
- Services to medium sized markets
 - > Thanks to CAB subsidies and cross subsidies
 - > the longest routes subsidize the shortest in the sixties (CAB study)
- Development of large (profitable) airlines
 - > 11 trunks in 1978 dealing with all continental traffic, 13 locals, many smaller airlines (the commuters)
- → Safe activity

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The effects of regulation : the perverse effects

- No price competition, but frequency competition
 - > too many flights, bad load factors (50% in 1976)
 - > high costs (flying empty costs the same as flying full!)
 - high tariffs (airlines asked CAB for higher prices)
- → Airlines are too well protected :
 - > no incentives to reduce costs: at the end of the seventies, the trunks are called "the dinosaurs"
- The public is faced with too high prices
 - > air transport still largely reserved to business travelers





1-3 Europe before liberalization

- → Until the mid 80th, international traffic is ruled by (non liberalized) bilateral agreements
 - no competition : the aim is to protect the national airlines
- The canvas:
 - > one "main" airline for each country
 - capacity is shared equally (and revenues can be shared)
 - > prices are fixed by IATA
 - double approval rule

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2 - The deregulation years : from 1978 until today

- → Domestic traffic in the USA deregulated in 1978
- →International agreements evolve towards more competition since 1978 between the USA and the rest of the world
 - > gradually more price freedom since 1978
 - > new "open skies" agreements proposed since 1992
- → European "Domestic" traffic liberalized between 1987 and 1997
 - > a largely free European market

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2-1 The VS deregulation

- → Context and objectives
- The Airline Deregulation Act
- →What happened?
 - ➤ Market structure
 - > Networks
 - Prices
 - Airlines
- The results



The VS deregulation: the context

→ Politic context

- Liberal policies: "Markets do better than the government"
- Many deregulations to come in all sectors of the economy (the Reagan era: 1980-1988)

→ Economic context


- Profitable industry (very few subsidized routes)
- Large (and inefficient) airlines
- Potential oligopolistic competition
- > Skepticism about economies of scales

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Returns to scale



The objectives of the US deregulation

- The first step is to introduce more competition by deregulating
- Competitive pressure will then give airlines incentives to lower their costs
- → More competition and lower costs should result in lower prices and better services
- Lower prices will then lead to a faster development of traffic and a higher social welfare
 - > more people will have access to air transport

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The Airline Deregulation Act (Oct. 1978)

- → After a short transitory period, the market become «free» for all airlines (old and new) to access and serve
- → Access to the market
- → Traffic rights (after 3 years)
- Prices (after 4 years)
- → Mergers and agreements ruled by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
- → Subsidies allocated by auctions (Essential Air Services)





What happened?

- Difficult to really know the pure effects of deregulation!
 - The industry would also have evolved without deregulation
 - ➤ It is very sensitive to the economic environment
- → Short term and long term effects on:
 - The structure of the market
 - > Networks : development of the hub and spoke
 - > Prices
 - Airlines

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The structure of the market : 1978 - 1983

- The first post deregulation period is one of intense competition
 - New airlines are created (about 120)
 - Existing small airlines (commuters) enter the nation-wide market (about 80)
- Severe competition between new and old airlines
 - Price competition (price wars)
 - Aggravated by the 1981 crisis of overcapacity (oil shock)
 - In 1983 bankruptcy of Branif, ending this period





The structure of the market : 1983 - 2007

- → Progressive concentration of the market
 - > Bankruptcies and mergers, few new entrants
- Development of « mega carriers » with an extensive network, owning smaller subsidiaries
 - The large 1978 airlines have either disappeared (Pan Am, TWA, Eastern Airlines, Branif...)
 - > Or they have turned into « mega carriers » (American Airlines, United, Delta, Continental)
- → A new model of airline has been developing: the low-cost airline (following Southwest)

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The US majors : from 1978 to 1998

1978

Trunks				
Airline	Market Share			
United	21,9%			
American	13,6%			
Eastern	12,2%			
Delta	11,0%			
TWA	9,6%			
Western A.L.	5,2%			
Continental	4,6%			
Braniff	3,9%			
National	3,6%			
Northwest	2,7%			
Pan Am	1,2%			

1998

Majors					
Airline	Market Share				
Delta	17,1%				
United	17,0%				
American	16,1%				
Northwest	8,2%				
USAir	7,9%				
Continental	7,8%				
Southwest	6,8%				
TWA	4,3%				
America West	3,4%				
Alaska	2,2%				
Total	91,0%				

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The US market in 2011

- From the post deregulation new actors, only 2 large remain (Southwest, US Airways)
- The market is more concentrated than in 1978
 - > Several mega-carriers have been merging
 - US Airways + America West
 - Delta + Northwest
 - United + Continental
- The low-cost market is a dynamic and profitable «niche»
 - > And another merger : Southwest + Airtran

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Networks : the hub and spoke system

- Looking at the European airlines, the US airlines invent the hub and spoke network:
 - > Network centered on a main airport : the hub,
 - > With routes (nearly) all going to and from the hub
 - > Add the idea of optimizing the connection times (banks of arrivals and departures)
- They choose hubs in un-congested airports, in large cities (Denver, Atlanta, Dallas...)
- All large airlines choose this type of network and abandon the point to point network





The effects of deregulation on prices

- →Old price structure :
 - > 2 prices + 2 discount prices
 - \triangleright prices based on distance : $p = a \times distance + b$
- →New prices:
 - > several discount prices with restrictions
 - prices based on competition and revenue optimizing (development of revenue management)
 - price wars

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
Have prices gone down?

- → A sure decrease in prices on average
 - ➤ A study (G. William) concludes that prices are 15% lower than they would have been without deregulation
- but differences due to competition level
 - > Other studies (GAO) show that prices are higher (+30%) on non competitive routes than on others





Evolution of prices on the US market



The effects of deregulation on airlines

- → Restructuring of existing airlines
 - costs reductions
 - productivity increases
 - fleet restructuring (hubs!)
- → Development of new management and commercial tools:
 - Computerized reservation systems (CRS)
 - Frequent Flyers Programs (FFP)
 - > Revenue (or Yield) management
- > New concept of airline : the low-cost airline






The results : 30 years later

- → Important increase of traffic
 - larger access to air transport
 - better services, lower prices
 - > with the negative effect of congestion
- → No safety problems
- → Concentration of the market and profitability problem for majors
 - > competition from "low cost" airlines
 - > Majors too dependent on the domestic market

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Results of deregulation in the USA



2-2 Deregulation of International traffic

- Trend initiated by the USA
 - ≥ liberal context
 - > "bad" re-negotiation of the Bermuda agreement (Bermuda II, 1977)
 - domestic deregulation in 1978
- The USA will try to impose more competition between airlines in all their bilateral agreements
 - > they think that competition is better for everybody
 - but especially for the US airlines

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
Re-negotiation of bilateral agreements 1978 -1985

- Agreement in 1978 between The USA and the Netherlands
 - > Double disapproval rule : free prices (or nearly free)
 - ➤ In exchange for the Netherlands cooperation : 2 new entry points in the USA for KLM
- The result is diversion of European traffic towards the Netherlands
 - The other European countries are obliged to renegotiate (1978 -1985)
 - > Same strategy in the Pacific area (with Singapore)





The traffic diversion of 1978



The effects of the first steps of liberalization

- → Traffic growth : x3 between France and the USA between 1982 and 1994!
 - > Falls in prices
- → Disappearance of charter traffic on the North Atlantic routes
- The US airlines increase their traffic shares on some markets (France, Germany, ...) but loose on others
 - > overall the market is divided rather equally
- > Price wars





The North Atlantic market 1982-1993

	1993		1982		% croissance
Compagnies :	US	Europe	US	Europe	du trafic
USA/France					
Passagers (000)	2 419,6	1 176,9	675,9	666,1	168,0%
Part de marché	67,3%	32,7%	50,4%	49,6%	
USA/Royaume-Uni					
Passagers (000)	4 995,2	6 563,8	3 090,6	2 210,1	118,1%
Part de marché	43,2%	56,8%	58,3%	41,7%	
USA/Allemagne					
Passagers (000)	3 289,7	2 369,1	1 103,2	1 235,9	141,9%
Part de marché	58,1%	41,9%	47,2%	52,8%	
USA/Total					
Passagers (000)	14519,27	16867,6	6815,9	8301,5	107,6%
Part de marché	46,3%	53,7%	45,1%	54,9%	

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1991, a difficult year

- The Gulf war, and its effects on air transport:
 - higher fuel prices,
 - > economic slowdown,
 - > reductions in demand
- →Over-capacity on the markets
 - > Aircraft deliveries
 - > American, United and Delta arrive in Europe
 - Leading to new price wars on the North Atlantic
- The USA want to review their bilateral agreements





1992, the "open skies" agreements

- The USA want more competition on the markets
 - > no limits on capacity
 - > no restrictions on price
 - > more 5th freedom rights
- They need to give something in exchange
 - > entry points!
- → New type of agreement "proposed" by the USA
 - > same strategy as in 1978 to impose their view
 - > first country to sign agreement: the Netherlands in 1992

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Structure of an "open skies" agreements

- → No restrictions on frequencies and capacities
- → Permission to operate between all points of both countries without restrictions
- → No restrictions on price
- → All possible 5th freedom rights are automatically granted
- → Possibility of signing code sharing agreements with US airlines
 - > a compensation for the absence of cabotage rights in the USA





2-3 The European single market

- → Steps of European liberalization
 - > The three packages
- → Consequences of liberalization
 - Airlines
 - > Infrastructure
 - Passengers
 - > International traffic

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The steps of the European liberalization

- →1957: Treaty of Rome
- → 1986: Single European Act
- →1987: first package of European liberalization
- → 1990: second package of European liberalization
- → 1992: third package of European liberalization
- April 1997: end of transitory period, full effects of liberalization laws





1957 : Treaty of Rome

- → Creates the European Economic Community
 - > ...to promote...a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities... the raising of the standard of living and quality of life...
- The means (among others):
 - > the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
 - > a common policy in the sphere of transport
 - > a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted

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The first steps

- → 1983: inter-regional air services liberalized
- →1986 : single European Act
 - > creation of the single European market (01/01/1993)
 - decision to include air transport in the common market
- →1986: the "Nouvelles Frontières" ruling
 - decision of the European court of justice in favor of "Nouvelles Frontières"
 - > The European commission encourages competition



The first package (1987)

- → Extension of 1983 law on regional services
- → Prices : 2 pricing areas
 - > reduced prices: between 65 and 90% of full fare
 - > very reduced price : between 45 and 65% of full fare
- → Routes : Multi-designation on routes of more than 250000 passengers
- → Capacity shares: from 50/50 to 60/40
- → Limited 5th freedom rights
 - > with restrictions: one airport is not a first category airport

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The second package (1990)

- → Final extension of 1983 law
 - > all 3rd and 4th freedom right liberalized
- → Prices : 2 pricing areas
 - > reduced prices: between 80 and 94% of full fare
 - very reduced price : between 30 and 79% of full fare
- → Routes: Multi-designation on routes of more than 140000 passengers
- → Capacity shares: from 60/40 to 25/75
- → More 5th freedom rights and limited cabotage rights





The third package (1992)

- >Free prices (01/01/1996)
- → Capacity shares : no limitations
- →5th and 7th freedom rights liberalized (01/01/1995)
- Cabotage liberalized (01/04/1997)
- → Free access to the market for all airlines from the community
 - > new legal concept

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Consequences of liberalization : the airlines

- → Restructuring of major European airlines
 - privatization of most public national airlines
 - > costs reductions, search for efficiency
 - more cross-border restructuring to come...due to new bilaterals
- → New entrants: the low-cost
 - > Following the model designed by Southwest
 - Main ones are: Ryanair, Easyjet
 - ➤ low-cost, low fares





Consequences of liberalization : infrastructures

- →Old and new hubs
 - ➤ large hubs have been re-organized : scheduling of flights more efficient in order to minimize connection time
 - > new hubs are appearing : medium size hubs mostly
- → Traffic increase and smaller planes
 - pressure on airports and airspace
 - problem of the slot allocation on major airports : barrier to entry for competitors

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Consequences of liberalization : the passenger

- → More frequencies and more destinations
 - consequence of the increase in traffic
 - > and of the shuttle system
 - > and of the new organization of hubs
- → Lowered fares
 - > more competition on domestic routes
 - but most international routes are still operated by only 2 carriers
 - > Fares difficult to measure (lack of statistics)





Consequences of liberalization : International traffic


- → International traffic inside Europe liberalized for European airlines
 - > New routes opened, new airlines operating them
 - Only restrictions are airports slots at busy airports
- International traffic with the rest of the world
 - Old bilateral agreements challenged by EC
 - Nov. 2002 ruling by European Court of Justice: "the open skies judgments"
 - It led to new rules and new agreements

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New routes opened!



Source: OAG schedules, European Commissio

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The open skies judgments

- → With old bilaterals, European carriers had only access to international routes from their home countries
- → The EC considered this as a distortion of competition between EU airlines and went to court over 8 agreements with the USA.
- → The ruling stated that these agreements were contrary to the EU Treaty.
- As a consequence, all of the bilateral agreements between EU Member States and other countries contained illegal elements and had to be modified

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International traffic: new rules

Two options:

- → Let countries revise bilateral to include nondiscrimination
 - > 114 agreements corrected*
- → The European Commission negotiates new "horizontal agreements" with foreign countries
 - changes with 35 partner states and one regional organization with 8 member states*, representing formerly 615 bilateral agreements
 - Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Singapore, USA...





International traffic: the case of US-EU negotiations

- → Negotiations June 2003-march 2007
 - > Several conflicting points
 - > Agreement reached in march 2007: new agreement came into force in march 2008
- → Three problems to address :
 - ✓ European airlines have international access only from their home country

 - 8 No access to the US market for European airlines (US airlines do have a large access to the European market!)

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The European Common Aviation Area (ECAA)

- → Integrate neighbor countries inside European aviation area
 - > 8 countries from south east Europe (Balkans)+ Iceland and Norway have signed
 - Second group : Mediterranean countries
 - Morocco has signed
 - > Third group: Russia and neighbors
- → Benefits :
 - > Same market operation rules, improving security, safety, air traffic, environmental protection
 - development of markets: economic benefits





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3- An evolving situation today (1)

- → For better or for worse, air transport has been largely deregulated
 - > USA
 - **Europe**
 - > International markets
- This trend will go on, and more markets will become deregulated, or more lightly regulated
 - Trend strongly encouraged by the USA except on domestic market, and by Europe (ECAA)





An evolving situation today (2)

- As a result, more and more competitive markets
 - Inside deregulated areas (US market, Europe)
 - > Between those areas: North Atlantic market, USpacific market
- At odds with an old regulatory structure which limits airlines freedom
 - > The bilateral system still holds
 - > Ownership restrictions : system of national airlines in a world of multinational companies because of bilateral agreements

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The "old" bilateral system

- → Prevents airlines from restructuring over borders, for fear of loosing traffic rights
 - > maintains small, unprofitable "national" airlines (Asia)
 - > Partly solved in Europe by the new rules at European 1eve1
- Leads them to an alliance policy, inadequate substitute to restructuring
 - Is questioned by IATA and ICAO
 - > evolutions in the years to come





Possible evolution of bilaterals

- The ownership clause could be replaced by an activity clause
 - ➤ an airline having its operations in one country(airport base, employees, management) instead of having its capital owned by nationals, would be considered as a "national airline" in bilateral agreements
 - this airline would be controlled by the country's authorities (to prevent flags of convenience)
- This would enable cross border restructuring
 - and maintain high level of control (safety, finances...)

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Or no bilaterals?

- Creation of large « free »area like ECAA : important degree of freedom inside those areas
 - > No need of bilaterals inside
- → If ECAA is successful, it could be enlarged, or copied elsewhere...





Remaining role of the Authorities

- → Monitor the markets :
 - > traffics, prices, airlines financial situation...
 - give actors in the industry a fair access to information
- Look for anti-competitive practices and prevent them as far as possible
 - monitor competition conditions
 - > make sure airlines have access to the markets
- → Monitor partnerships and mergers
 - in order to avoid monopolization

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Remaining questions

- → Internationalization of airlines
 - > On what conditions: safety and security aspects, social aspects...
- → What Authorities?
 - In a global airline industry, there is a need for a "global" Authority, even if local ones remain useful: ICAO?
- → Some countries may want to stay aside
 - In order to "keep" the domestic market for national airlines (China?)



